Alexander v. ICAO, 00CA1061 (August 16, 2001): In 1997, claimant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Clai-mant alleged he was exposed to asbestos at work and as a result became permanently disabled in 1997, with the last injurious exposure in 1986, but the employer's insurer was insolvent and had been placed in permanent receivership by a Texas court in 1994. That court established July 31, 1995, as the deadline for filing proofs of claim with the receiver. Claimant did not file a proof of claim with the receiver until 1998.
In the Colorado claim, Colorado Insurance Guaranty Association (CIGA) was substituted for the insurer. CIGA was created by the Colorado Insurance Guaranty Association Act, § 10-4-501, et seq., C.R.S., to allow insureds to recover on claims against insolvent insurers. CIGA steps into the shoes of the insolvent insurer to pay claims within the coverage and limits of the insurance policy. Section 10-4-508(1)(a), C.R.S., states that CIGA "shall pay the full amount of any covered claim arising out of workers' compensation policies," but it further states that "a covered claim shall not include any claim filed with [CIGA] after the final date set by the court for the filing of claims against the liquidator or receiver of an insolvent insurer."
CIGA moved for summary judgment, and argued that because claimant had failed to file his proof of claim by the 1995 deadline, his claim was not a "covered claim" that CIGA was required to pay pursuant to C.R.S. § 10-4-508(1)(a). Claimant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the basis that § 10-4-508(1)(a) was unconstitutional. An administrative law judge (ALJ) granted CIGA's motion and dismissed claimant's claim. ICAO affirmed. The ALJ and ICAO declined to address the constitutional arguments.
The court of appeals affirmed. The court held that § 10-4-508(1)(a) did not violate claimant's right to equal protection because there is a rational basis for the exclusion from coverage in § 10-4-508(1)(a) of claims filed after the deadline set in the receivership proceeding. The exclusion of late claims serves the legitimate governmental purpose of avoiding excessive delay in payment and financial loss to a claimant or insured because of the insurer's insolvency.
The court also disagreed with claimant's contention that § 10-4-508(1)(a) denied him access to the courts in violation of article II, § 6 of the Colorado Constitution, which provides that "Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character." However, article II, § 6 does not create a substantive right, but rather provides a procedural right to a judicial remedy whenever there is a substantive right that accrues under Colorado law. Here, because claimant did not file a timely claim in the receivership proceeding, under the plain language of § 10-4-508(1)(a), his claim against CIGA was not, by definition, a "covered claim," and he had no cognizable legal basis to recover from CIGA and the constitutional right of access to courts was not implicated.